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Objectifi cation and Transgender Jurisprudence: 
The Dictionary as Quasi-Statute
Q
Christopher Hutton*
This paper analyzes defi nitional issues raised by terms such as “man” and 
“woman” in transgender jurisprudence, focussing on the Court of First 
Instance decision in W v Registrar of Marriages. Courts frequently seek guid-
ance on ordinary meaning in standard works of lexicography. But this objecti-
fi es the trans party by treating so-called “ordinary” meaning and the dictionary 
defi nition as determinative. 
Introduction
In this paper I will examine issues that arise when legal interpretation 
and adjudication turn on the meanings of ordinary words, focussing on 
the defi nitional question at the heart of the recent Court of First Instance 
judgment delivered by Andrew Cheung J,1 in which a transgender woman 
was denied the right to marry her male partner. The assumption has been 
widely made in the case law that what is at stake is the everyday mean-
ing of words such as “man” or “male” and “woman” or “female”. There 
has been frequent resort to dictionary defi nitions, as well as the evoca-
tion of “common usage” and “ordinary meaning”. To consider why many 
judges fi nd resort to the dictionary convenient or necessary, I will review 
the case law within which the recent Hong Kong decision is fi rmly 
embedded.2
Defi nition and law in transgender cases (the UK context)
For over three decades the leading common law case on the right of a 
transgender person to marry in their affi rmed sex was the English decision 
* School of English, University of Hong Kong. The author would like to thank Dr Marco Wan 
for introducing him to this area of the law, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions 
and advice.
1 W v Registrar of Marriages [2010] 6 HKC 359.
2 For discussion of Hong Kong context, see Robyn Emerton, “Neither Here nor There: The 
Current Status of Transsexual and Other Transgender Persons under Hong Kong Law”, (2004) 
34 HKLJ 245, and “Time for Change: A Call for the Legal Recognition of Transsexual and 
Other Transgender Persons in Hong Kong”, (2004) 34 HKLJ 515. For an incisive survey, see A. 
Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (London: Cavendish, 2002).
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in Corbett v Corbett.3 The judge (Ormord J) determined the validity of 
the marriage on biological (or bio-medical) criteria, that is, the fi rst three 
of the four criteria which he derived from expert medical opinion. These 
criteria were: (i) chromosomal factors; (ii) gonadal factors (i.e., presence 
or absence of testes or ovaries); (iii) genital factors (including internal 
sex organs);  (iv) psychological factors. The congruence of the fi rst three 
features (as had been the case with the respondent before the surgery) 
was determinative of sexual identity:
The question then becomes, what is meant by the word “woman” in the con-
text of a marriage, for I am not concerned to determine the “legal sex” of the 
respondent at large. Having regard to the essentially hetero-sexual character 
of the relationship which is called marriage, the criteria must, in my judg-
ment, be biological, for even the most extreme degree of transsexualism in 
a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance which can exist in a person 
with male chromosomes, male gonads and male genitalia cannot reproduce a 
person who is naturally capable of performing the essential role of a woman 
in marriage.4
No reference was made to dictionary defi nitions or popular understand-
ings of the meaning of the terms “man” and “woman”. It would how-
ever be misleading to say that the judgment was simply based on medi-
cal evidence. The judge abstracted a legal principle out of the medical 
evidence, and this has been applied in a wide range of cases, not of all of 
which have concerned marriage.5
By the time Bellinger v Bellinger6 was decided by the House of Lords, 
there was clear recognition that the social, legal, medical and intellectual 
climate had changed, in particular the European Court of Human Rights 
judgment in Goodwin v United Kingdom.7 In a dissenting judgment in the 
Court of Appeal, Thorpe LJ had rejected the Corbett criteria as outmoded 
both in terms of medical science and changes in social attitudes to sex/
gender and marriage.8 The discussion in the House of Lords remained 
oriented towards the submissions of medical experts, but that evidence 
included assertions that psychological sex might in part be a post-natal 
developmental process. Nonetheless ultimately the biological approach 
3 [1970] 2 WLR 1306.
4 Ibid., p 106.
5 R v Tan [1983] 1 QB 1053.
6 [2003] 2 AC 467.
7 (2002) 35 EHRR 18. See also the “inter-sex” case of W v W [2001] WLR 674 which placed a 
limit on the applicability of the Corbett test.
8 [2002] Fam 150, 185.
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of Corbett remained unchallenged, with the distinction between male 
and female defi ned by Lord Nicholls in terms of the distinct roles played 
in reproduction: “A male produces sperm which fertilise the female’s 
eggs”.9 This defi nition underlay the legal status conferred by sexual clas-
sifi cation, and it was right that “society through its laws decides what 
objective biological criteria should be applied when categorising a person 
as male or female”.10 Self-perception or self-defi nition was not a factor 
that the law could recognise: “Individuals cannot choose for themselves 
whether they wish to be known or treated as male or female. Self-defi -
nition is not acceptable. That would make nonsense of the underlying 
biological basis of the distinction”11 and involve an unauthorised exten-
sion or modifi cation of word meaning: “Recognition of Mrs Bellinger 
as female for the purposes of s 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 would necessitate giving the expressions ‘male’ and ‘female’ in that 
Act a novel, extended meaning: that a person may be born with one 
sex but later become, or become regarded as, a person of the opposite 
sex.”12
Lord Nicholls denied that the case law had so far produced “objec-
tive, publicly available criteria by which gender reassignment is to be 
assessed”.13 This reasoning was echoed by Lord Hope of Craighead, who 
agreed that “the expressions ‘male’ and ‘female’ in s 11(c) of the Mat-
rimonial Causes Act 1973 are not capable of being given the extended 
meaning that would be needed to accommodate her case”,14 given the 
“impossibility of changing completely the sex which individuals acquire 
when they are born”.15 As Corbett had made clear, “the words ‘male’ and 
‘female’ should each be given a single, clear meaning that can be applied 
uniformly in all cases”.16 
The judgment looked at two Australian cases where the issue had 
been identifi ed as the “common understandings” of the ordinary Eng-
lish words “male” and “female”, Secretary, Department of Social Security v 
State Rail Authority17 and Re Kevin.18 In the latter case, Chisholm J had 
held that the “ordinary contemporary meaning” of the word “man” 
in the Australian context “included post-operative female to male 
9 Bellinger (n 7 above), para 28.
10 Ibid., para 28.
11 Ibid., para 28.
12 Ibid., para 36.
13 Ibid., para 42.
14 Ibid., para 56.
15 Ibid., para 57.
16 Ibid., para 58.
17 (1993) 118 ALR 467.
18 (2001) 165 FLR 404.
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transsexuals”.19 Lord Nicholls agreed with the assertion that the word 
“male” and “female” should be given their “ordinary, everyday meaning 
in the English language”.20 But he saw nothing in the materials before 
the court to suggest that the ordinary meaning included “post-operative 
transsexual persons”.21 The judge then cited the New Shorter Oxford 
Dictionary (1993) where the primary meaning of “male” when used as an 
adjective was “of, pertaining to, or designating the sex which can beget 
offspring”.22 He added: “No mention is made anywhere in the extended 
defi nition of the word of transsexual persons”.23 These defi nitions were 
in accord with the decision in Corbett: “The fact is that the ordinary 
meaning of the word ‘male’ is incapable, without more, of accommodat-
ing the transsexual person within its scope”.24 Even the Australian cases 
drew a distinction between the pre-operative and post-operative states: 
“Any attempt to enlarge its meaning would be bound to lead to diffi culty, 
as there is no single agreed criterion by which it could be determined 
whether or not a transsexual was suffi ciently ‘male’ for the purpose of 
entering into a valid marriage ceremony”.25
Emphasizing once again the tradition relationship between marriage 
and sexual reproduction, the judge concluded that there was no way in 
his view that the words “male” and “female” in s 11(c) of the 1973 Act 
could be interpreted so as to include female to male and male to female 
transsexuals.26 The European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v United 
Kingdom had included a quotation from the United Kingdom’s Interde-
partmental Working Group on Transsexual People (April, 200027) to the 
effect that “[m]any people revert to their biological sex after living for 
some time in the opposite sex and some alternate between the two sexes 
throughout their lives”.28 For Lord Hobhouse, this highlighted “the nov-
elty of the idea of gender by choice”.29 The Goodwin decision represented 
a signifi cant departure from previous understandings of what the words 
“respectively male and female” meant. However, given that decision, the 
Court issued a declaration of incompatibility with the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under the ECHR.
19 Bellinger (n 7 above), para 327.
20 Ibid., para 62.
21 Ibid., para 62.
22 Ibid., para 62.
23 Ibid., para 62.
24 Ibid., para 62.
25 Ibid., para 62.
26 Ibid., para 64.
27 London: HMSO.
28 (2002) 35 EHRR 18 (p 447), 463.
29 Bellinger (n 7 above), para 76.
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Australian case law 
Most common law jurisdictions have faced questions of transgender 
rights, including the right to marry in the affi rmed gender.30 In this sec-
tion the Australian case law will be discussed, as this has played the most 
signifi cant role in the international common law discussions. Secretary, 
Department of Social Security v State Rail Authority31 concerned an appeal 
against an order granting married benefi t entitlement to a pre-operative 
MTF transgender woman who was the partner of an invalid pensioner. 
The Social Security Act (s 37(1) of 1947) did not defi ne “woman” or 
“female” or “opposite sex”, but defi ned “wife” as “a female married per-
son”. The provision included “de facto” spouses. The Tribunal had based 
its decision on “psychological sex” as the determining factor. In the 
appeal, Black CJ noted that terms at issue in the case were “of course 
ordinary English words”,32 adding that: “[i]n ordinary English usage words 
such as ‘male’ and ‘female’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ and the word ‘sex’ relate 
to anatomical and physiological differences rather than to psychologi-
cal ones”.33 Defi nitions from the Oxford English Dictionary and Macquarie 
Dictionary were cited in illustration of this in which “female” was defi ned 
in terms of bearing offspring, and “sex” in terms of reproductive anatomy 
and physiology. For Black CJ, it followed that:
There is no occasion to depart in this case from the ordinary meaning of the 
words used in the Act and it would be going well beyond the ordinary mean-
ing of the words in question to conclude that a pre-operative male to female 
transsexual, having male external genitalia, is a “woman” for the purposes of 
the Social Security Act and may be a “wife” as that expression is defi ned in 
the Act. I do not consider that the language used in the relevant parts of the 
Act allows primacy to be given to psychological factors and certainly not to 
the virtual exclusion of anatomical factors.34
However, the Corbett criteria were no longer appropriate, and recent 
case law gave “convincing reasons for rejecting the concept that when 
the law speaks of male or female persons it necessarily speaks on the 
footing that sex is unchangeable”.35 In the case of post-operative indi-
viduals, the law should recognise the new gender: “Whatever may once 
30 See Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence (n 3 above).
31 SRA (n 18 above).
32 Ibid., p 301.
33 Ibid., pp 301–302.
34 Ibid., p 303.
35 Ibid., p 304.
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have been the case, the English language does not now condemn post-
operative male-to-female transsexuals to being described as being of 
the sex they profoundly believe they do not belong to and the exter-
nal genitalia of which, as a result of irreversible surgery, they no longer 
have”.36 Where after medical intervention, “the genital features and the 
psychological sex are in harmony, that person may be said, according 
to ordinary English usage today, to have undergone a sex change”. The 
terms “sex change” and “sex change operation” were widely understood, 
including the limitations of such procedures in relation to reproduction. 
Dictionaries recognised these terms, though they also used the term 
“apparent” in qualifying “change of sex”. Medical experts and legal com-
mentators used these expressions without quotation marks, and terms 
such as “sex conversion” and “sex reassignment surgery” were more cur-
rent in these specialist discourses. At the same time there was “a grow-
ing awareness in the community of the position of transsexuals” and “a 
perception that a male-to-female transsexual who has had a ‘sex change 
operation’ or a ‘sex change’ may appropriately be described in ordinary 
English as female”.37 The words “woman” and “man” were used in the 
Act “as ordinary English words”. It was a question of law “whether the 
evidence before the Tribunal reasonably admits of different conclusions 
as to whether the facts or circumstances fall within the ordinary mean-
ing of those words”.38
In SRA, Lockhart’s judgment paid considerable attention to the fact/
law question. The “threshold” decision as to whether words in a statute 
were used in their ordinary meaning, or in some other, more technical 
or scientifi c sense, was a question of law. If it was determined that the 
ordinary meaning was at stake, then that became a question of fact “as 
to the common understanding of the phrase”.39 But the next step was a 
question of law, that is, “whether or not the evidence before the Court 
reasonably admits of different conclusions as to whether certain facts 
or circumstances fall within the ordinary meaning of the relevant word 
or phrase”. If different conclusions were “reasonably possible”, then the 
decision as to which one was correct was a question of fact.40 Lockhart J 
reached the same conclusion as Black CJ, namely that:
In my opinion a woman or a female, as those terms are generally understood 
in Australia today, includes a person who, following surgery, has harmonised 
36 Ibid., p 304.
37 Ibid., p 306.
38 Ibid., pp 312–313.
39 Ibid., p 312.
40 Ibid., p 312.
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psychological and anatomical sex. A male-to-female transsexual, following 
reassignment surgery, is a woman and a female. A female-to-male transsex-
ual, following such surgery, is a man and a male.41
However the court regretfully had to reach the conclusion that: “Where 
the anatomical sex and the psychological sex have not harmonised I can-
not accept that such a person falls within the ordinary meaning of the 
words ‘woman’ or ‘female’.”42 This same principle had been applied by 
the majority in R v Harris,43 where the issue was the defi nition of “male 
person” under an offence which related to acts or procurements of acts of 
indecency between males: 
The law could not countenance a defi nition of male or female which depends 
on how a particular person views his or her own gender. The consequence of 
such an approach would be that a person could change sex from year to year 
despite the fact that the person’s chromosomes are immutable.44
The conviction of the pre-operative (or better, “non-post operative”) 
transgender defendant was upheld.
In Re Kevin45 Chisholm J followed the SRA judgment. It was a question 
of law “what criteria should be applied in determining whether a person 
is a man or a woman for the purpose of the law of marriage,” and a ques-
tion of fact “whether the criteria exist in a particular case”.46 He rejected 
the proposition put forward in R v Cogley47 that the sexual identity of an 
individual was a question of fact not law. Further, Chisholm criticised 
the judgment in Corbett for eliding the distinction between “biological 
sexual constitution” and “true sex”. The proposition that the appropriate 
“true sex”, thus defi ned, was a legal requirement for a valid marriage, was 
presented as a legal conclusion but it had been “merely assumed”.48 There 
was no appeal to explicit legal authority or principle, merely “a defi ni-
tional sleight of hand”, exploiting the notion of “true sex”.49 There was 
no rule of construction that ordinary words should be given the meaning 
they had at the time of the legislation; rather, he found general support 
for the proposition that ordinary words are generally to be given their 
41 Ibid., p 325.
42 Ibid., p 327.
43 (1988) 17 NSWLR 158.
44 Ibid., p 170.
45 Re Kevin (n 19, above).
46 Ibid., p 418.
47 [1989] VR 799, pp 803–806.
48 Re Kevin (n 19 above), p 418.
49 Ibid., p 420.
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ordinary contemporary meaning.50 There was no reason to presume that 
the legislation passed in 1961 had in contemplation the approach to the 
defi nition of “man” found in Corbett. Corbett did not in fact engage with 
earlier meanings of the word “man”, but rather drew on medical opin-
ion.51 The contemporary meaning was the relevant one, and this could 
be drawn from “the context of the legislation, the body of case law on the 
meaning of ‘man’ and similar words, the purpose of the legislation, and 
the current legal, social and medical environment”.52 
The judgment took as relevant to varying degrees the meaning of 
“man” in relation to the status of post-operative individuals the decisions 
in SRA and R v Smith, a series of statutes concerned with birth registra-
tion, sexual reassignment, anti-discrimination, criminal law, passports 
where the meaning of sex-specifi c terms includes those of transgender 
status, the behavior of the medical authorities in relation to Kevin’s med-
ical treatment and participation as a father in the artifi cial insemination 
programme,53 and a wide range of expert opinion in law and medicine:
it seems to me quite orthodox, rather than radical, to apply to marriage the 
ordinary meaning of the terms “man” and “woman”, as set out in the Aus-
tralian authorities and thereby ensure that the law of marriage is not out 
of alignment with other laws and social practices, and the most informed 
medical practice. That ordinary meaning would not include a woman who 
simply announced that she was a man, or anything of the sort. It includes 
only individuals who are post-operative transsexuals.54
The marriage was upheld as valid. In the appeal, A-G for the Common-
wealth v Kevin,55 the court agreed that question of whether the words 
such as “man” and “marriage” were used in a technical or ordinary sense 
was indeed a question of law:56
we take the view that the words “marriage” and “man” are not technical 
terms and should be given their ordinary contemporary meaning in the con-
text of the Marriage Act. In our view, it thus becomes a question of fact 
as to what the contemporary, everyday meanings of the words “marriage” 
and “man” are respectively. It then is a question of law for this Court to 
50 Ibid., p 429.
51 Ibid., p 431.
52 Ibid., p 431.
53 Ibid., p 439.
54 Ibid., pp 467–468. 
55 (2003) 172 FLR 300.
56 Ibid., p 323.
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determine whether, on the facts found by the trial judge, it was open to him 
to reach the conclusion that he did, namely that at the relevant time, Kevin 
was a man and that the marriage was therefore valid. 
The absence of a statutory defi nition of the words “man” and “marriage” 
negated any attempt to argue that the Marriage Act was a code tied to 
specifi c defi nitions. The court had jurisdiction to determine the mean-
ings of key terms in the statute, and this had not taken the court into the 
realm of “judicial legislation”.57 
The United States
The Corbett decision has an important place in the history of United 
States jurisprudence, so much so that “it came to be viewed as integral 
to US case law on the subject”.58 In its review of case law, the court in 
Re Estate of Marshall G Gardiner59 noted that the earliest decision in US 
law was Re Matter of Anonymous v Weiner,60 which issued a fi nding that a 
birth certifi cate could not be altered to refl ect an affi rmed gender. How-
ever in MJ v JT.61 the court took the (MTF) post-operative status of the 
plaintiff as decisive in upholding the validity of the marriage and the 
claim for maintenance. But Corbett had been followed in Re Ladrach62 
and Littleton v Prange.63 The majority opinion in Littleton began with the 
question: “When is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman?”, 
continuing: “The deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a 
physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and coun-
seling, or is a person’s gender immutably fi xed by our Creator at birth?”64 
The majority judgment did not cite linguistic defi nitions or refer directly 
to popular usages, though it did note that “transsexual” was “a term not 
often heard on the streets of Texas, nor in its courtrooms”.65 
The Kansas Court of Appeals (Re Estate of Marshall G Gardiner66) 
applied a multifaceted test, on the basis that the sex at time of mar-
riage was a complex matter of fact. Relevant criteria were taken from an 
57 Ibid., p 363.
58 Anthony S. Winer, “Assimilation, Resistance, and Recent Transsexual Marriage Cases”, (2003) 
1(3), Seattle Journal for Social Justice 653, 662.
59 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan Ct. App. 2001), at 1100.
60 50 Misc.2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1966).
61 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
62 513 NE2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987).
63 9 SW3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999).
64 Ibid., p 223.
65 Ibid., p 225.
66 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan Ct. App. 2001).
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academic article, namely gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, external 
morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex and gender 
of rearing, and sexual identity.67 The court followed the decision in MT 
in recognizing the acquired identity where the anatomy and the gender 
had been harmonised. In reversing the lower court verdict it concluded 
that “Marshall knew of the transsexual nature of J’Noel, approved, mar-
ried, and enjoyed a consummated marriage relationship with her”, and 
also cited a medical academic who had argued, in relation to the gender 
assignment of inter-sex children: “[i]n the end it is only the children 
themselves who can and must identify who and what they are. It is for us 
as clinicians and researchers to listen and to learn”.68 
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, relying on principles of statutory 
interpretation and a set of related assertions about linguistic meaning. The 
court rejected the relevance of the amended Wisconsin birth certifi cate 
and driver’s licence: “We view the issue in this appeal to be one of law and 
not fact. … The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this 
court has unlimited appellate review”. It was the intent of the legislature 
that should govern, and the rule that “[w]ords in common usage are to 
be given their natural and ordinary meaning”.69 The determination that 
the question was one of law actually devolved the question onto ordinary 
linguistic usage, and away from the particular factual circumstances of the 
individual at the heart of the case: “The words ‘sex’, ‘male’, and ‘female’ 
are words in common usage and understood by the general population.”70 
The court cited Black’s Law Dictionary which defi ned sex as the “sum of 
the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a 
female organism; the character of being male or female”, and this defi ni-
tion from Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary: “either of the two 
divisions of organisms distinguished as male or female; males or females 
(especially men or women) collectively”. In the same source “male” is 
defi ned as “designating or of the sex that fertilises the ovum and begets 
offspring: opposed to female”. “Female” is defi ned as “designating or of the 
sex that produces ova and bears offspring: opposed to male”. These defi ni-
tions are applied to the case at hand in the following fashion:
The words “sex”, “male”, and “female” in everyday understanding do not 
encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary meaning of “persons of the 
67 Ibid., at p 1094, citing Julie A. Greenberg, “Defi ning Male and Female: Intersexuality and the 
Collision between Law and Biology”, (1999) 41 Arizona Law Review 265.
68 William Reiner, “To Be Male or Female-That is the Question”, (1997) 151(3) Archives Pediat-
rics & Adolescent Medicine 224, 225.
69 273 Kan. 191 (2002), p 212.
70 Ibid., p 212.
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opposite sex” contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and 
not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria. A male-to-female post-
operative transsexual does not fi t the defi nition of a female. The male organs 
have been removed, but the ability to “produce ova and bear offspring” does 
not and never did exist. There is no womb, cervix, or ovaries, nor is there 
any change in his chromosomes. … J’Noel does not fi t the common meaning 
of female.71
This Corbett-infl uenced line of cases continued with Re A Marriage License 
for Nash,72 where the court concluded that “a marriage between a post-oper-
ative female-to-male transsexual and a biological female is void [in Ohio] 
as against public policy”.73 A dissenting opinion by Judith A Christley J 
noted the dire history of such public policy arguments, in their assump-
tions about gender characteristics and roles, race, slavery, and homosexu-
ality, where “[w]ithout exception, the continuation of those prejudices 
was defended in the name of natural law, the God-given order of things, 
and because it had always been that way. Then, as today, the defenders of 
the status quo always seemed to have God’s lips to their ears”.74 In Kanta-
ras v Kantaras the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida concluded: 
“We agree with the Kansas, Ohio, and Texas courts in their understand-
ing of the common meaning of male and female, as those terms are used 
statutorily, to refer to immutable traits determined at birth.”75
W’s case (2010): a question of defi nition
Following a survey of the background to the case, Andrew Cheung J 
concluded: 
Thus analysed, it is immediately apparent that what a person’s sex is, whether 
a person is “male” or “female”, and whether such a person, in adulthood, 
should be described as a “man” or “woman”, are ultimately questions of defi -
nition. Put another way, the crucial issue is: whose defi nition?76 
The applicant argued that on the proper interpretation of s 40(2) of the 
Marriage Ordinance, the words “man” and “woman” included a post-
operative transsexual individual in his or her acquired or affi rmed sex, 
71 Ibid., p 213.
72 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.).
73 Ibid., p 9.
74 Ibid., p 10.
75 884 So.2d 155 (2004), 161.
76 W v Registrar of Marriages (n 2 above), para 15.
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and that the same was true for the words “male” and “female” in s 21 of 
the Marriage Ordinance and in s 20(1)(d) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Ordinances. The judge noted that the terms “man”, “woman”, “male” 
or “female” were defi ned neither in the Marriage Ordinance, nor the 
Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, concluding that the matter was “left to 
the interpretation of the court”.77 Lord Hope’s discussion of this issue in 
Bellinger was cited at length, including his conclusion based on diction-
ary defi nitions that “the fact is that the ordinary meaning of the word 
‘male’ is incapable, without more, of accommodating the transsexual per-
son within its scope”.78 The judgment noted that courts in Hong Kong 
are instructed to take a purposive approach to the interpretation of stat-
utes, taking into account “context and purpose” of statutory provisions, 
but without going so far as to “distort or even ignore the plain meanings 
of the text”.79 
Against a background set of assumptions that shaped Hong Kong law 
in the colonial era, the idea of “natural heterosexual Christian marriage” 
was evidenced by the use of gender-specifi c terms. Thus under s 20(1)(d) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance a marriage shall be void if the par-
ties are not “respectively male and female”, a subsection which is traced 
from Corbett via s 1(c) of the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971 and s 11(c) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Corbett, along with its assumptions 
about the nature of marriage, thus represented the status quo as far as 
Hong Kong law is concerned.80 There was however a degree of latitude to 
interpret the law in the light of “developing circumstances”81 so long as 
this did not lead the court “to alter the meanings of the words originally 
used in ways which do not fall within the principles originally envisaged 
by the enactment”.82 The court could to take account of “contemporary 
meaning and usage”,83 a factor which the judgment noted played a sig-
nifi cant role in Re Kevin and Bellinger v Bellinger, albeit with the courts 
coming to opposite conclusions. The judgment then drew on statements 
about “common usage” from Re Gardiner and Re Nash, and dictionary 
defi nitions (from Webster’s II New College Dictionary) cited in Re Nash, as 
well as the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6ed. 2007) where “woman” 
designates “an adult female person”, and “female” is defi ned as “of, 
77 Ibid., para 54.
78 Ibid., para 92.
79 Ibid., para 107.
80 Ibid., para 125.
81 Ibid., para 127.
82 Ibid., para 127.
83 Ibid., para 134.
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pertaining to, or designating the sex which can beget offspring or 
produce eggs”. 
As far as the Hong Kong context was concerned, the judgment argued 
that no evidence had been produced to negate “the Court’s own under-
standing” that “post-operative transsexual people in Hong Kong are still, 
in ordinary, every day usage and understanding, referred to as such”,84 
i.e. in Chinese terms that translate literally as “sex change person”, “sex 
change man”, “sex change woman” (i.e. 䅞ᗻҎ, 䅞ᗻ⬋Ҏ, 䅞ᗻཇҎ): 
Whilst it is quite true that a sex reassignment surgery is colloquially referred 
to as a “sex change operation” (䅞ᗻ᠟㸧), so far as the Court observes, the 
reference to “sex change” (䅞ᗻ) in the ordinary usage does not, or does not 
yet, represent a general understanding or acceptance that the person’s “sex” 
(whatever one understands the word to mean) has really been “changed”. I 
am therefore of the view that so far as the plain meaning of the text, or the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the relevant words, is concerned, the appli-
cant has not established a case that the relevant words, according to their 
ordinary, everyday usage in Hong Kong nowadays, encompass post-operative 
transsexuals in their assigned sex.85
The judgment pointed to diffi culties in identifying where the line should 
be drawn along a continuum from the case of a transgender individual 
who has undertaken no role change or medical intervention to some-
one who “undergoes complete reconstructive surgery”.86 These were 
questions that the court “when embarking on a construction exercise 
in interpreting the everyday words ‘man’ and ‘woman’ cannot answer”.87 
There was also the question of the legal situation in respect of those 
wishing to reverse some aspect of the reassignment process88 and allow-
ing the post-operative transsexual to marry “would be tantamount to 
sanctioning same sex marriage”.89 Case law showed a range of responses 
to the relevance and status of the ability to perform the sexual role of the 
assigned gender within the marriage.90 These were policy matters beyond 
the limits of acceptable statutory interpretation, and more properly a 
matter for comprehensive legislation. The requirement that courts give 
an interpretation which was fundamentally rights-compatible did not 
84 Ibid., para 140.
85 Ibid., para 140.
86 Ibid., para 143.
87 Ibid., para 144.
88 Ibid., para 147.
89 Ibid., para 148.
90 Ibid., paras 151–153.
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sanction a departure from the principle laid down in Corbett that, for the 
purpose of marriage, sex “is and continues to be determined according 
to … biological sex at birth”.91 This anticipated the conclusion drawn 
in the second part of the judgment, where it was further asserted that 
“the meaning of the words ‘man’ and ‘woman’ and therefore the mean-
ing of the word ‘marriage’ as used by the drafters of the Basic Law when 
it was promulgated in 1990 cannot be seriously in doubt”.92 This was 
before fundamental changes in European jurisprudence and the deci-
sion in Goodwin. This must a fortiori be the case for the Joint Declara-
tion Annex I,93 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.94 Given that marriage was “both a legal institution and a social 
one”, constitutional rights should not go beyond “societal consensus”. 
The fact that medical opinion had shifted to a degree, so that the view 
that sex was an immutable characteristic had been challenged, was wor-
thy of note, but “the law’s defi nition of a person’s sex serves a purpose 
that is not necessarily identical to that served by a medical defi nition”.95 
Sexual identity as understood in the context of marriage in its historical 
essence refl ected the idea that “the ability to reproduce one’s own kind 
still lies at the heart of all creation, and the single characteristic which 
invariably distinguishes the adult male from the adult female throughout 
the animal kingdom is the part which each sex plays in the act of repro-
duction”, especially in the context of a “predominantly Chinese society 
like Hong Kong”.96 The required social consensus was absent.
Sexing the dictionary
There has been considerable discussion in the case law as to whether 
the defi nition of the statutory terms “man” and “woman” is a question of 
law, of fact, or of some combination of the two. The question has been 
described as a “Catch-22” for transgender plaintiffs.97 For the Kansas 
Supreme Court, those cases that had found for transgender plaintiffs 
(MT and Re Kevin) treated the question as one of fact, whereas the line 
of cases from Corbett to Littleton had treated the question of a person’s 
91 Ibid., para 162.
92 Ibid., para 184.
93 JD Ref 150–151 adopted in 1984.
94 adopted 1966, date of applicability 1976.
95 W v Registrar of Marriages (n 2 above), para 201.
96 Ibid., para 206.
97 Susan Frelich Appleton, “Contesting Gender in Popular Culture and Family Law: Middlesex 
and Other Transgender Tales”, (2005) 80 Indiana Law Journal 392, 431.
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sex as a matter of law. In general, “law” based approaches have relied 
on an interlocking combination of medical orthodoxy, gender essential-
ism, and ordinary meaning, including dictionary defi nitions, whereas 
“fact” based approaches have drawn on reformist medical opinion, and 
social changes as evidenced by offi cial policy on birth certifi cates, fund-
ing for gender reassignment/reaffi rmation therapy, and other indicators. 
This distinction has also been framed as one between legal formalism, 
an approach which “relies on formal relationships dictated by law”, and 
factual functionalism, which looks at the “functions or attributes or 
‘realities’ that are deemed to be operative”.98 The reformist-functionalist 
judgments have however recognised self-perception only to the extent 
that it has been validated through medical intervention, especially 
surgery, to produce a normative harmony between psychological iden-
tity and sexual anatomy. While these judgments reject the notion that 
assigned birth sex is immutable, they have required a determinate post-
operative gender outcome in terms of heterosexual orientation and/or 
sexual function, body presentation/aesthetics, etc.99 On the question of 
presentation rather than actual sexual function, the court in the New 
Zealand case of Attorney-General v Otahuhu Family Court stated: “Where 
two persons present themselves as having the apparent genitals of a man 
and a woman, they should not have to establish that each can function 
sexually.”100 The judgment in W’s case followed the fi rst “law” model, and 
strongly echoed the judgment in Bellinger. 
In the case law on transgender questions discussed above, there 
was no direct defi nitional guidance from statute, and little or no rel-
evant policy discussion from the respective legislatures.101 In jurispru-
dential discussion, dictionary defi nitions are often presented merely a 
means of aiding the judge’s memory102 or providing “potential mean-
ings from which the Court would select based on statutory, legislative 
intent, common sense, or some other contextual argument”.103 However, 
98 Ruthann Robson, “Reinscribing Normality? The Law and Politics of Transgender Marriage”, 
in Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, Shannon Price Minter (eds.), Transgender Rights 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 299–309, 301.
99 See Robson, ibid., Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence (n 3 above).
100 [1995] 1 NZLR 603, 613–614, discussed in Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence (n 3 above), p 127.
101 Glanville Williams, “Language and the Law”, (1945) 61 Law Quarterly Review 71, 82–3; Cabell v 
Markham 326 U.S. 404 (1945) 739, per Judge Learned Hand.
102 Nix v Hedden 149 U.S. 304 (1893), at 306–7: “dictionaries are admitted not as evidence, but 
only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.”
103 See Kevin Werbach, “Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation”, (1994) 107 
Harvard Law Review 1437, 1439–1440. For discussion of the role of the dictionary in US juris-
prudence and the new textualism, see Samuel L. Thumma, and Jeffrey Kirchmeier, J. “The 
Lexicon has become a Fortress: the United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries”, (1999) 
47 Buffalo Law Review 227.
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lacking defi nitional guidance, courts in transgender cases have applied 
a “dictionary approach”,104 behaving as if “dictionaries provide perfect 
category boundaries” and applying those boundaries “to contexts never 
considered by the authors of dictionaries”.105 Ironically, the question of 
transgender “law” has required orientation points that lie beyond law in 
the social realm, in the guise of “current usage” or “ordinary meaning” as 
represented in dictionaries. 
Dictionaries are conservative in a number of senses. Dictionaries 
aspire to depict in neutral terms a language as an object of description 
in which linguistic forms are paired with meanings. In so doing, diction-
aries reify or normalise meanings as stable entities. There is a signifi -
cant time-lag between the lexicographic work and the publication of the 
dictionary, since no large-scale project can constantly review all of its 
entries for present relevance, and in any case dictionary-makers look for 
settled patterns rather than record idiosyncratic usage which may or may 
not become stabilised. In areas of socio-cultural change, and scientifi c or 
medical developments, dictionaries are a poor guide to the current debate 
or the state of the art. The distinction often made between prescriptive 
and descriptive dictionaries is at best relative and at worst highly mis-
leading, as all dictionaries undertake complex processes of abstraction 
and normalisation, and in consequence are widely perceived to entrench 
authoritative information about language. Given the unbounded array 
of potential sources, contexts and sub-cultures for lexicographers to draw 
on, the choices made must inevitably fall dramatically short of compre-
hensiveness and representatively of the language as a whole, entrenching 
socio-cultural or other biases. Reader expectations and market demand 
create requirements that dictionary-makers must meet in order to remain 
profi table. Dictionaries build on previous editions (and also other dic-
tionaries), so there is often a layered effect as new meanings are added 
onto existing ones. This temporal sequencing also creates a core-margin 
continuum, as older or original meanings are frequently understood as 
foundational. Dictionaries register or affi rm metaphysical orderings, 
from the concrete to the abstract for example, or the biological to the 
social. This has both a temporal dimension, in that concrete meanings 
are assumed to precede abstract ones, and a metaphysical dimension, in 
that categories that refer to physical or biological entities are deemed to 
be prior to those that refer to social, metaphorical or abstract meanings. 
Dictionaries present meanings as independent of context and speaker, 
104 Anne C. DeCleene, “The Reality of Gender Ambiguity: A Road toward Transgender Health 
Care Inclusion”, (2007) 16 Law & Sexuality 123, 130.
105 Werbach, “Looking it Up” (n 104 above), p 1452.
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and in that sense defi nitional meaning is reifi ed so as to lie beyond the 
agency and control of the individual speaker. Yet in transgender juris-
prudence, agency, self-defi nition, self-ascription and personal autonomy 
(whose defi nition?) are of fundamental concern. 
Furthermore, dictionaries generally fail to include large numbers of 
words in current use, either because these are used by sub-groups whose 
texts or discourses are beyond the ken of mainstream lexicography, or 
given the lexicographers’ desire to ensure that a particular term or usage 
has stablised  and generalized – a requirement that entrenches normative 
views about what is and is not part of “the language”. Rejecting the linear 
model of gender identity, Vade lists the following roles or positions in 
what he terms the “gender galaxy”: “trans, tranny boy, tranny girl, trans-
sexual, transgender, Shinjuku boy, boi, grrl, boy-girl, girl-boy-girl, papi, 
third gender, fourth gender, no gender, bi-spirit, butch, dyke-fag, fairy, 
elf girl, glitterboy, transman, transwoman – just to name a few”. He cites 
the following self-defi nition from a response to a San Francisco Human 
Rights Commission Survey: “Hormonally enhanced, pre-op, trans, gen-
derqueer, butch-dyke with recurring femme moments! I’m just your aver-
age boy-girl-boy, really”.106 It is hard to see what mainstream lexicogra-
phy has to contribute here.107 
In SRA the court made the statement that “[w]hatever may once have 
been the case, the English language does not now condemn postopera-
tive male-to-female transsexuals to being described as being of the sex 
they profoundly believe they do not belong to and the external genitalia 
of which, as a result of irreversible surgery, they no longer have”.108 In Re 
Kevin it was affi rmed that in Australian English the “ordinary contem-
porary meaning” of the word “man” included “post-operative female to 
male transsexuals”.109 While these judgments were reformist in the con-
text of the previous case law (though open to criticism for reifying one 
particular form of transgender identity as recognisable at law), it would 
have been preferable to insist that the “English language” has never 
taken – and could never take – a position on this matter. It has been 
106 Dylan Vade, “Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Concep-
tualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People”, 11 (2004–5) Michigan 
Journal of Gender and Law 253, 266.
107 On linguistic creativity and transgender identities, Don Kulik, “Transgender and Language: A 
Review of the Literature and Suggestions for the Future”, (1999) 5 GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian 
and Gay Studies 605. For some further terminology, see Raven Usher, North American Lexi-
con of Transgender Terms (San Francisco: GLB Publishers, 2006), and the discussion in Susan 
Stryker, Transgender History (Berkeley: Seal Press, 2008), 7–24. On the political status of the 
term “transgender” itself, see Paisley Currah, “Gender Pluralisms”, in Currah et al (eds.), Trans-
gender Rights (n 99 above), 3–31.
108 SRA (n 18 above), p 304.
109 Ibid., para 327.
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judges who have interpreted linguistic usage so as to nullify statements of 
self-defi nition and gender affi rmation. 
Neither dictionaries, nor any class of expert on language (e.g. aca-
demic linguists), nor any presumptions about linguistic usage or social 
consensus as to meaning, are in a position to offer authoritative defi ni-
tions of terms such as “male” and “female”. The idea that each word can 
be reduced to a defi nition (or set of defi nitions) is a fi ction both of law, 
lexicography and mainstream academic linguistics. It is a product of par-
ticular linguistic assumptions inculcated through formal education, and 
an artifact of the availability of linguistic intuitions about meaning as 
an abstract and defi nable entity.110 The resort to the dictionary involves 
a forgetting of the process of selection, abstraction and normalisation 
that has been undertaken, a process which leaves the defi nition at many 
removes from the unfolding linguistic-behavioural social world. Further, 
the distinction between consulting a dictionary to refresh one’s memory 
as to a meaning, and integrating a dictionary defi nition decisively into 
one’s reasoning processes, is impossible to sustain. Meaning is not fi xed 
in the mind or in memory, and in any case the act of refreshing one’s 
memory as to meaning takes place in a particular context where two or 
more contested meanings have already been introduced into the legal 
argument: In reaching for the dictionary, there is a danger of judges for-
getting “their individual responsibility for determining the meaning of 
words”:111 “dictionaries tend to deal in standard or established usage and 
defi nitions, rather than contentious, border-line or emergent ones that 
become critical in legal actions”.112
The issue at the heart of W’s case is one of self-defi nition. It is not 
about the defi nition of a class of objects, but of a human being endowed 
with refl exivity. Individuals have the uncontested right to label, name, 
categorise and attribute qualities to themselves in all domains beyond 
the reach of law, and this should be the starting-point for law itself.113 To 
attribute authority to dictionary defi nitions over the domain of linguistic 
110 Roy Harris and Christopher Hutton, Defi nition in Meaning and Practice: Language, Lexicography 
and the Law (London: Continuum, 2007).
111 James Weis, “Jurisprudence by Webster’s: The Role of the Dictionary in Legal Thought”, (1987) 
39 Mercer Law Review 961, 976.
112 Michael Toolan, “The Language Myth and the Law”, in Roy Harris (ed.), The Language Myth in 
Western Culture (London: Curzon, 2002), 159–182, 176.
113 See the Yogyakarta Principles (2006), for example Principle Three: “Persons of diverse sexual 
orientations and gender identities shall enjoy legal capacity in all aspects of life. Each per-
son’s self-defi ned sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their personality and is 
one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom”. Available at www.
yogyakartaprinciples.org.
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facts is to treat the lexicographer as a kind of linguistic legislator. The 
legislator produces quasi-statutes in the form of defi nitions which are 
then used as general statements which “prescribe meaning”114 and are 
to be applied to particular fact patterns. This is objectifi cation through 
defi nition. In transgender cases, courts have applied the dictionary as 
“black letter law” or quasi-statutes, implying onto everyday language a 
false categorical rigidity. The defi nitions in question “serve to further 
exclude and isolate the transgender community”,115 with courts behav-
ing when faced with the defi nition of social institutions such as marriage 
“as though the dictionary represented the full universe of defi nitional 
options”.116
Linguists may argue that “dictionaries are a crude and frequently 
unreliable aid to word meaning and usage”, but the fundamental meth-
odological and ethical objections to reliance on dictionaries in cases of 
refl exive self-defi nition and human identity apply no less to analysis of 
current usage by linguists.117 Most linguistic approaches to meaning are 
concerned with capturing underlying defi nitional essences, and their 
idealisations leave no space for the complexities of gender. Mainstream 
models in academic linguistics, such as those that seek to map out lin-
guistic universals, reproduce, indeed drastically sharpen, normative defi -
nitional boundaries.118 
In an aside, Ormord J in Corbett noted that the question was “what is 
meant by the word ‘woman’ in the context of marriage” and he was not 
“concerned to determine the ‘legal sex’ of the respondent at large”.119 
This might be read as a concession, but Corbett has in fact been applied 
in this way. One might debate the question of whether there is a form 
of legal status corresponding to “legal sex at large”. But what is clear 
is there is no such concept as the true meaning of the words “man” or 
“woman” at large, otherwise law and lexicography would between them 
smother every social interaction and act of self-defi nition. Lexicography 
has no special rights in this domain, and cannot operate as a guide to law 
114 Ellen P. Aprill, “The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court”, (1998) 
30 Arizona State Law Journal 275, 334.
115 DeCleene, “The Reality of Gender Ambiguity” (n 105 above), p 130.
116 Susanne B. Goldberg, “Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation Discrimination,” 
(2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1375, 1387.
117 Clark Cunningham, Judith Levi, Georgia Green, and Jeffrey Kaplan, “Plain Meaning and Hard 
Cases”, (1994) 103 Yale Law Journal 1561, 1563.
118 See Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka, “Men, Women and Children: The Conceptual 
Semantics of Basic Social Categories”. Available at http://www.colorado.edu/ling/courses 
(accessed 2 January 2011).
119 W v Registrar of Marriages (n 2 above), para 106, citing Corbett (n 4 above), p 106.
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about the proper use of social labels such as “man” and “woman”. The 
dictionary operates within law at the behest of law, and it is misleading 
to distinguish in this context between questions of law and questions of 
fact. What is presented as a question of “law” becomes an indeterminate 
mix of bio-medical, historical, theological, socio-cultural and linguistic-
lexicographic presumptions.
The dictionary and dictionary-style defi nition might well offer 
a useful (but not determinative) resource for certain purposes. For 
example, dictionaries might have a role in cases that concern the clas-
sifi cation of commercial objects for tax purposes,120 where the bound-
ary drawing exercise is often arbitrary, but their use in cases where the 
classifi cations at stake are those of fundamental importance to indi-
vidual identity and refl exive personhood, even under the guise of an 
aide to memory, raises serious ethical questions. “[I]nappropriate resort 
to the dictionary”121 undermines the legitimacy of judicial argumenta-
tion, in that it completes the act of objectifi cation and marginalisation 
which law has begun. In reaching for the dictionary courts are not 
applying the law, but rather rejecting self-identifi cation as relevant to 
legal sex.122
Conclusion
If the question at stake in W’s case is indeed the ordinary meanings of the 
terms “man” and “woman”, then the division in the judgment between 
statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation undercuts the 
constitutional claim in advance. The “law” in relation to transgender 
identity is interpreted by reference to defi nitional “fact” and everyday 
usage. Once the interpretative task has been defi ned in this way, the 
conclusion in W’s case becomes inevitable, since clearly a court is not in 
a position to change facts that are held to exist “out there” in the domain 
of linguistic defi nition, nor can any court alter the presumed social con-
sensus as to the true meanings of the terms “man” and “woman”. In her 
dissenting judgment in Littleton, Alma L López J argued that there was 
neither fact nor law to be found in the judgment. The case had been 
determined without reference to any facts (since a summary judgment 
120 In Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v United States, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000), 8–9.
121 Lawrence Solan, “When Judges Use the Dictionary”, (1993) 68 American Speech 50, 56.
122 Julie A. Greenberg, “The Roads Less Traveled: The Problem with Binary Sex Categories”, in 
Currah et al (eds.), Transgender Rights (n 99 above), 51–73, 66.
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had been given) and in the absence of applicable law: “the majority has 
determined that there are no signifi cant facts that need to be determined 
and concluded that Christie is a male as a matter of law. Despite this 
conclusion, there is no law to serve as the basis of this conclusion”.123 At 
the heart of the problematics of transgender jurisprudence is a fl awed and 
unethical theory of defi nition.
123 Littleton (n 64 above), p 232.
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